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China’s Ancient Principles of Price Regulation
through Market Participation: The Guanzi from a
Comparative Perspective 1
Isabella M. Weber
Abstract
The History of Economic Thought as a field has long taken it as a premise that so far
as ancient economic thought is concerned, only the Greeks and Romans are worth
studying. This paper introduces the Guanzi as a core text in ancient Chinese economic
thought on price stabilization from a comparative perspective with ancient Greek
contributions. The Guanzi presents a framework for the empirical analysis of market
fluctuations and price movements and derives principles of economic governance from
this analysis. In contrast Plato and Aristotle come to the question of price
determination from the angle of moral philosophy. They foreground the right
behaviour on the part of the individual not the structural features of the market. The
Guanzi articulates the so-called “light–heavy” (轻重, qingzhong) principles, where
heavy represents “important” or “essential” and light connotes “unimportant” or
“inessential.” It argues that essential subsistence goods and production inputs are
always “heavy,” while the relative importance of each commodity shifts with market
fluctuations. It suggests that the markets are inherently unstable, if left to their own
devises. The state should participate in the market of “heavy goods” in order to
stabilize the economy as a whole.
Keywords: History of Economic Thought, China, price theory, economic policy
1. Introduction
“One generally accepted assumption of Western economists is that, so far as ancient economic
theories are concerned, only the Greeks and Romans developed anything worthy of study …”
(Hu 2009, i). In the spirit of such a dismissive view of China’s ancient history of economic
ideas, it is common practice to simply ignore the contributions of Chinese thinkers to the
evolution of political economy. 2 Most standard textbooks in the field of the history of
economic thought do not make any mention of Chinese texts. The common historiography
still is the one reflected in Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis (1954). Schumpeter
1
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Hu’s (2009) book A Concise History of Chinese Economic Thought, written in the 1960s and 1980s, remains by
far the most comprehensive overview in English. Spengler (1964, p. 223) and Chang (1987, p. 481) observe that
works on the history of Chinese economic thought outside China remain extremely scarce. Two recent volumes
aimed at introducing key contributions of major Chinese historians of economic thought to an English-speaking
readership suggest that this has not changed significantly in the past few decades (Lin, Peach & Wang 2014; 2019).
Chen Huan-Chang’s (1911a; 1911b) PhD thesis has for a long time been “the only major attempt to describe
Confucian principles in economic terms to have appeared in English” (Witzel, 2002, xiv), and even though it was
positively reviewed by Keynes in The Economic Journal (1912), it was not followed up by work of similar depth.
None of the major textbooks in the Concise History of Economic Thought contains a discussion of Chinese
contributions.

asserted that there was nothing worth studying between the ancient Romans and Greeks and
the Italian Scholastics. In his words: “So far as our subject is concerned we may safely leap
over 500 years” (1954, p. 70). One may add, inferring from Schumpeter’s treatment of the
ancient world, that in his view one may not only skip the Islamic contributions of thinkers of
the stature of Ibn Khaldun who fall into Schumpeter’s gap, but also safely ignore the ancient
Chinese.
As a result of the attitude illustrated by Schumpeter’s classic, historians of economic
thought are rarely concerned with ancient Chinese contributions. A central inquiry in economic
theorizing since ancient times is the question of price determination. On this as on many other
core economic issues, China has a long history of theorizing in the statecraft tradition. One text
stands out in particular: The Guanzi. It is a core text in ancient Chinese economic thought on
price stabilization. As I develop in this chapter, the Guanzi’s approach to price regulation is
encapsulated in the so-called “light–heavy” (轻重, qingzhong) principles, where heavy
represents “important,” “essential,” or “expensive,” and light connotes “unimportant,”
“inessential,” or “cheap.” In contrast to the lineage from the ancient Greeks and Romans to the
Scholastics foregrounded by Schumpeter, the Guanzi is not concerned with the morally “just
price” and the ideal order of things. Instead, as I derive here, it analyzes the constantly changing
forces that determine prices in the emerging market economy of its time. The Guanzi
recommends the ruler of the state to study these empirical dynamics in order to manipulate them
with the aim of enriching the state, creating wealth for the people and stabilizing prices.
In its pragmatic outlook and focus on statecraft, the Guanzi is very different from its
Greek counterparts, from Plato’s quest for a utopian state and Aristotle’s insistence on the
distinction between natural and artificial social forms. 3 The Guanzi is not concerned with an
ideal state but with a feasible form of governance. A distinction between natural and artificial
remains of little relevance to the Guanzi since its aim is not to preserve a natural order but to
channel the prevailing – or natural – forces so as to create wealth for the state. The questions
pursued by Plato and Aristotle in their analysis of prices are normative: What price should be
charged? What constitutes fraud? Why should greed and profit be condemned? They are
concerned with the right price from the perspective of moral rules. In Roman legal thought this
moral inquiry later develops into laws that prescribe severe punishments against overcharging
in response to inflation, as for example in the Diocletian’s Edict of Maximum Prices (301
A.D.). 4 In contrast, we can think of the Guanzi as a very early form of positive economics that
is less about how things ought to be but about how they tend to be. The Guanzi proposes
principles of price determination in the market that take greed, pursuit of profit and fraud as
given. These principles of price determination are meant to serve the state in stabilizing prices
through commerce instead of through policing.
In the remainder of this chapter, I develop the Guanzi’s principles of price determination
and regulation in the context of the economic challenges at the time. In the conclusion, I return
to the comparative reflections just outlined. To be sure, I am not arguing that the Guanzi is
3
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representative of all of China’s ancient tradition of economic thought. In fact, the basic logic of
state market participation articulated in the Guanzi has been repeatedly and severely challenged
from a moral and idealist viewpoint in major, reoccurring debates in China (Weber 2020; also
see Chapter xx in this volume on the Salt and Iron Debate). What I propose here is that the
Guanzi merits comparative study. This chapter can only be a beginning of a much larger task.
2. The Guanzi’s Conception of Price Regulation through the Market 5
2.1. The Historical Context
The Spring and Autumn (772–476 BCE) 6 and mid-Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods,
widely considered “China’s golden age of culture” (Hu 2009, p.19), were an “unusual age …
when old orthodoxies had collapsed but new ones had not yet emerged” (Pines 2009, p. 220).
It was “the age of the ‘Hundred Schools’” (Pines 2018). During the mid-Warring States Period,
economic considerations became increasingly important for government theory, and economic
growth emerged as a major concern in light of constant warfare (Milburn 2007, p. 19). In many
ways, this period laid the foundation for Chinese philosophy and long-standing social,
economic, and political practices. This is not to suggest that the period was followed by any
form of stagnation or continuity. But it was a ground-breaking age for China’s intellectual and
institutional trajectory. Regarding economic questions, the writings collected in the so-called
Guanzi (管子) 7 are the most important of these ancient contributions. The Guanzi, one of the
largest of the ancient Chinese texts (Rickett 1993, p. 244), is considered by some to be the “most
representative … of the emerging political economy of the Warring States era” (von Glahn
2016, p. 77).
Historical scholarship shows that the Guanzi was written by several anonymous authors,
probably state planners and economic advisors (Chin 2014, p. 32; Hu 2009, p. 100). Irrespective
of the precise date of its creation, which is subject to scholarly debate,8 it is important that the
Guanzi was composed in the context of turbulent times after the collapse of the Western Zhou
and before the Qin dynasty unified China into a single empire for the first time. Most parts of
the Guanzi were written in the form of dialogues between Duke Huan (桓公，685–643 BCE)
of the state Qi and his advisor Guan Zhong （管仲， ca. 710–645 BCE) with the latter
providing answers to the questions of the duke (Chin 2014, p. 33; von Glahn 2016, p. 77). Guan
Zhong is recognized as “one of the most renowned and influential statesmen in ancient China”
(Hu 2009, p. 100). He was not an author of the Guanzi. The authors of the Guanzi referred to
Guan Zhong to express their vision of what they imagined to be his economic policies during
the rise of the state Qi to a temporary hegemon in the Spring and Autumn Period (von Glahn
2016, p. 44; Hu 2009, p. 100; Rickett 1998, p. 341).
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The dialogues in the Guanzi are set in the context of deep social and economic change. A
ritual order gave way to a time of war and chaos (Graham 1964, p. 29; von Glahn 2016, p. 82).
New military and economic forces were unleashed as part of a process of “big fish eating small
fish” (Li 2013, p. 182). Several hundred agrarian city states were merged into seven territorial,
bureaucratic states (von Glahn 2016, p. 44; 82; Li 2013, p. 182). Institutions gradually
developed that laid the foundation for a unified Chinese empire and shaped its future statecraft
(Li 2013, p. 182; von Glahn 2016, p. 46). A deep transformation of production occurred in
parallel with the emergence of a new political order. Family farms became the basic agricultural
production unit (Li 2013, p. 189; von Glahn 2016, p. 46; 82). The iron revolution introduced
new production techniques (Wagner & Needham 2008). Together, these changes brought about
a drastic improvement in agricultural productivity, which in turn gave rise to increasing
handicraft activities in the households and, ultimately, to an enhanced functional and regional
division of labour (Hu 2009, p. 19; von Glahn 2016, p. 65; 82).
This transformation in production propagated a fundamental change in the organization
of commerce and created the need for a new form of state market relations. Markets in the
Western Zhou Period were under strict, direct government control including price setting (Hu
2009, pp. 7-8). Following the breakdown of the Western Zhou a new urge for free trading of
commodities emerged (Hu 2009, p.19). The invention of coinage and the proliferation of
currency by the state facilitated long-distance trade. Commerce flourished, and a new class of
private merchants became prevalent (von Glahn 2016, p. 46; 64). The rulers of the Warring
States turned to this merchant class to assist them in establishing a new form of control over the
economy (von Glahn 2016, p. 46). It is in this historical context that some writers of the Guanzi
derived their remarkable recommendations on harnessing the newly unleashed market forces
by the state. At the core of their program were price regulations based on the light–heavy (轻
重) principles.
The next section introduces the basic theoretical outlook in the Guanzi. Following that
introduction, we will turn our attention to the application in concrete policies.

2.2. The Light–Heavy Principles
In the context of the fierce interstate competition of the Spring and Autumn Period, “all ducal
states had been hankering for the art of ‘making the state rich and the army powerful’” (Hu
2009, p. 120). The light–heavy principles were developed to meet these aims of strengthening
state and army. They find their most systematic expression in the Guanzi (Chin 2014, p. 31; Hu
2009, p. 120). Enriching the country is the starting point: “a ruler who is good at ruling the state
must first of all enrich his people, then govern them” (Guanzi as in Hu 2009, p. 102). As Rickett
(1998, p. 338) explains in his introduction to the Guanzi,
Qing 轻 means “light” and by extension “unimportant,” “inconsequential,” or “cheap.”
As a verb, it means to accord little or no value to something. Zhong 重 means “heavy,”
and by extension “important,” “serious,” or “expensive.” As a verb, it means to value
something. As a compound the two characters usually mean “weight.”

Based on this literary meaning, Ye’s (2014, p. 98) translation as “Weighing and Balancing
Economic Forces” is apt. From the perspective of qingzhong, all economic phenomena can only
be understood relationally; things can be heavy or light only in relation to other things. Heavy
commodities are considered essential to production or human well-being, and light
commodities are seen as inessential. But precisely what commodity is defined as heavy or light
is subject to constant change and reflects the season of the year, production practices, and
market dynamics, among other factors. The task of economic policy is to weigh and balance, to
use what is found to be heavy in order to offset what is light. Or, in the words of the Guanzi:
“To use the thing that is ‘heavy’ to shoot at that which is ‘light’, to use the cheap to level down
the dear, these are the great advantages that can be drawn from the application of the ‘light–
heavy’ doctrine” (Guanzi as in Hu 2009, p. 127).
Hence, the state should not work against the spontaneous forces inherent in the economy,
society, and natural environment; it should instead use these forces to first enrich and then
govern the people while generating revenue for the state. State regulation must be based on
detailed knowledge of the real conditions and their changes. To this end, the Guanzi
recommended extensive empirical surveys and the use of statistics and calculations (Chin 2014,
p. 42; Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, pp. 389-95; Hu 2009, pp. 155-7; von Glahn 2016, pp. 7-8).
The state was to observe the movements in the market manifested in price changes as well as
prevailing fundamental conditions such as population, natural resources, skills, seasonal
changes, and regional peculiarities. As far as the prices of specific commodities were
concerned, the ruler had to understand the following principles, determining what was “heavy,”
or dear, and what was “light,” or cheap: “When things are plentiful, they will be cheap; when
they are scarce, they will be expensive” (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, p. 384).
In modern language, this principle says that the price of a commodity is determined by
its scarcity. But prices were also affected by a second principle: “Goods if concentrated will
become ‘heavy’, but will turn ‘light’ once they are scattered about” (Guanzi as in Hu 2009, p.
124).
This pointed to the institutional structure of suppliers as one of the determinants of prices.
If the goods are in the hands of few (i.e., they are monopolized), they will be expensive. If many
suppliers offer identical goods, the goods will be cheap. In other words, scarcity is not simply
about the absolute quantity of goods in the market but also about the distribution of these goods
across producers. If goods are concentrated in few hands, those in control of supply can generate
artificial scarcity to charge higher prices. The Guanzi anticipated the idea of monopoly price
markups.
Furthermore, the demand for goods influenced their price: “Goods worth being hoarded
will become ‘heavy’, and conversely [if not worth hoarding] will become ‘light’. Goods
cornered will be ‘heavy’, or otherwise will be ‘light’” (ibid., p. 124).
This principle suggested that goods that are demanded as a store of value of some sort,
rather than to satisfy some immediate need or want, will increase in price when people try to
hold onto their wealth in some physical, non-monetary form. When there is a rush on such
goods and they are withdrawn from the market, they become scarce and hence expensive.

Finally, the government’s taxation affected the price, according to the Guanzi: “An urgent
decree to collect tax in the form of certain goods will make the goods in question ‘heavy’, but
a go-slow decree will make them ‘light’” (ibid., p. 124).
With regard to taxation, the writers of the Guanzi saw time as the crucial factor: If people
have to pay a certain commodity as tax to the government in a rush, the price will shoot up, but
when they have time to collect the required commodities, this will not be the case. In modern
language, we call the underlying phenomenon a “demand shock.”
All these principles build on the idea that relative value depends on supply and demand.
But rather than focusing on the equilibrium between supply and demand, as economists are
accustomed to do in modern neoclassical economics, the Guanzi explores reasons for change.
The crucial point is that all these price-determining conditions were thought to vary depending
on concrete circumstances. Things are not universally “heavy” or “light”; they change their
designation depending on the context, which is analysed in ways more dynamic than a simple
assessment of some given constellation of supply and demand. Therefore, the Guanzi
suggested: “There is no rigid art of the ‘light’ and ‘heavy’, but to respond to anything that is
showing signs of coming and to take advantage of any tidings heard” (Guanzi as in Hu 2009,
pp. 127-8).
As a result, the art of governing depended on being flexible: “The true king takes
advantage of the situation, and the sage takes advantage of the principles of change” (ibid., p.
41).
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the qingzhong principles only knew the
movements in the market. Qingzhong economic policies aimed to use the individual pursuit of
profit and self-interest to enrich the state while balancing and integrating the economy. When
people valued something, it would become “heavy” or in the opposite case “light.” Yet social
wealth was defined not in terms of the subjective value but in terms of the fundamentals of
material well-being. In a vastly agricultural society this was essentially the ability to cultivate
the land to its fullest. Labour and land were the ultimate sources of wealth; and because the
subsistence of people depended on grain, it was considered the most fundamental commodity
in the Guanzi: “A man can’t eat without grain, grain can’t grow without land, land can’t do
without man, and man can’t get rich without labour” (Guanzi as in Hu 2009, p. 104). Grain,
being the centrepiece of wealth, takes the most crucial position in relation to all other
commodities and is hence of utmost importance in the qingzhong economic policy. Grain, it is
suggested, determines the price of all other commodities, including money:
The price of commodities will rise or fall along with the value of money, and it is grain
alone that will determine whether they are expensive or cheap. … When grain is
expensive, all other things are cheap, when grain is cheap, all other things are expensive
(Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, p. 367).
This means that the value of money move in opposite directions. The price of grain affects
all people in determining the general price level. At the same time, it affects the rural and urban

populations in different ways. Even before the writing of the Guanzi, Li Kui, the economic
advisor to Duke Wen of the Wen State, noticed9
If grain … was very expensive it would injure the people (other than the farmers); while
if it was very cheap it would injure the farmers. … Consequently whether [the price
was] very high or very low, the injury was one and the same (Han Shu as in Swann
1950, pp. 139–40, insertions in original).10
In the Guanzi, this notion is further developed. The balancing of the grain price becomes
the core of the “art of planned fiscal management” (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, p. 361), an art
of government that aims to achieve stability and prosperity for the state, using the principles of
qingzhong. This policy of balancing the grain price is the subject of the next section.

2.3. Balancing the Grain Price
Besides recognizing grain as the “people’s Master of Destiny” (ibid., p. 384; 77), the
progression of the seasons is another condition that qingzhong economic policies take as a
starting point. We read in the Guanzi that “the climatic changes of the four seasons and the
rotation of day and night were objective laws. They could not be decreased if they were
oversupplied and could not be increased if undersupplied” (as in Hu 2009, p. 105). From this,
the following problem arises. Qingzhong suggests that the price depends on whether something
is oversupplied or undersupplied. Depending on the season, grain is oversupplied (harvest) or
undersupplied (spring). As a result, the price fluctuates—which is bad both for peasants and for
urban consumers. Thus, the ruler faced the question of how to balance the price of grain
throughout the year. According to the Guanzi, “states that adhere to the way of a true king act
in accordance with the seasons” (ibid. 1998, p. 365). This suggests that, in general, the state
must “make use of what is valued to acquire what is not valued and what has been acquired
cheaply to ease the price of what has become too expensive” (ibid., pp. 381-2). Furthermore,
“when the prince mints coins to establish a money supply, the people all accept them as a
medium of exchange” (ibid., p. 380). Hence, the prince can issue money. “Therefore those who
are skilled in government manage mediums of exchange in order to control the Masters of
Destiny” (ibid., p. 378). The government has a responsibility to stabilize the price of grain in
order to stabilize the overall price level and the value of money.
This manifested as government purchase of surplus grain from the peasants in autumn, at
harvest time, when it was oversupplied and its price was low—in other words, grain was “light”
and money was “heavy.” By demanding relatively large amounts, the government drove up the
price of grain. It thereby balanced the relative quantities of money and grain in the market,
prevented the downward movement of the grain price, and protected the peasants from selling
their grain at overly low prices to private merchants. In each locality, the government
established public granaries to store the grain. In spring, when the farmers were ploughing and
sowing, and in summer, when they were weeding, their grain reserves would run low. The
supply of grain on the market was short, and the grain price was high. At that time, the
9
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government used parts of the grain stored away to increase the supply in the market. The
government balanced the upshot in the price of grain and protected the peasants from having to
buy grain at very high prices from private merchants. 11
The scheme stabilized both the price for grain and the general price level. First, we have
seen that in the Guanzi, the prices of all things depended on that of grain. Second, by
participating in the market for grain, the state adjusted the money supply. Since the value of
money, like that of all other commodities, was found to depend on its quantity, a change in the
money supply would affect its value in relation to all other goods. In other words, it would
change the overall price level. 12 According to the Guanzi, “When grain is cheap, he [the prince]
exchanges money for food” (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, pp. 377-8). In such a situation, money
would be “heavy” and would buy a relatively great amount of grain, hence the price level is
low. As the state bought a considerable amount of grain, the price of grain rose, but the value
of money also fell, and hence a deflationary tendency was balanced. The opposite occurred in
spring and summer, when grain was expensive. The state balanced the price of grain in money
and the price of money in grain by balancing the quantities of money and grain in circulation.
This is how the Guanzi envisioned the government to “manage mediums of exchange in order
to control the Masters of Destiny” (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, pp. 377-8). This was the basic
scheme of grain price balancing. Beyond the immediate effects on prices, it had important
implications for state revenues, inequality, and famine prevention through countercyclical
policies.
First of all, although the state balanced the price movements, it did not aim for complete
stability—“When water is perfectly level, it will not flow” (ibid., p. 308). The price of grain in
autumn would still be higher than in spring and summer, but the price difference would be
smaller than it had been without the state’s participation in the market. As a result of the price
difference, the state participation in the grain market generated government revenues. The state
did not have to impose any direct taxes: “By taking advantage of government orders to move
goods and money back and forth, there is no need to make any demands on the people in the
form of special taxes and levies” (ibid., p 392). The rulers of Western Zhou had fixed prices by
decree and extracted surpluses from the people by direct taxation. In contrast, the new art of
government was to use price fluctuations to enrich the country without undermining the
enthusiasm of the peasants. Mastering this new “art of planned fiscal management” was “not
something to create resentment among the people or ruin their aspirations” (ibid., p. 362).
11
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Instead of taking away from the people by command, the state sold grain to the people when
they needed it, thereby lowering the price, and bought grain from the people when they had it
to sell, thereby raising the price. Instead of being subjected to direct taxation, the people would
experience the state as a benevolent government. In sum, this approach would create “stability
similar to placing a square object on the ground” (ibid., p. 367).
Furthermore, the policy of balancing grain prices prevented great inequalities without
making all people equal.13 At the time, a class of private merchants was rising. In fact, the
government learned the techniques of market participation from the merchants. As prices were
not directly controlled by the state any longer, it became apparent that “[a]s the harvest is bad
or good, grain will be expensive or cheap” (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, p. 379). If the
government did not utilize these price movements to generate public profit, private merchants
would do so: “if the prince is not able to control the situation, it will lead to large-scale traders
roaming the markets and taking advantage of the people’s lack of things to increase their capital
a hundredfold” (ibid.).14
The profit motive was not condemned morally in the Guanzi but faced as a reality: “it is
the nature of men that whenever they see profit, they cannot help chasing after it” (Guanzi as
in Rickett 1998, p. 219). The task of the ruler was hence not to appeal to the morality of the
people but to use the prevailing interests and “regulate the people’s profits” (ibid., p. 379). In
order to do this, the state had to “maintain control over policies affecting prices” (ibid., p. 366).
Land reform was not enough to prevent inequalities: “Even though the land may have been
divided equally, the strong will be able to gain control of it; even though wealth has been
distributed equally, the clever will be able to accumulate it” (ibid., p. 379). If the government
failed to balance the grain price, “it will only result in the people below enslaving each other.”
When such “great inequality exists between rich and poor,” the “multitude is not well governed”
(ibid., p. 380). Hence, “[s]hould the prince fail to maintain control over policies affecting
prices … the economic policy of the state becomes meaningless” (ibid., p. 366).
Finally, and most essentially, the participation in the grain market allowed the state to
accumulate grain in each locality and protect people from the consequences of natural disasters.
An elaborate system of famine prevention worked hand in hand with a countercyclical fiscal
policy. The government’s task was to protect the people from the changes of the seasons,
climate, and the market and to ensure their access to daily necessities at all times. The state
employed the people when the seasons did not require them to work in the field. In this way,
the state prevented the source of wealth from drying up. The ruler was to practice frugality in
13
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swine. … The people, brought to grief, had no means of livelihood; and they became thieves and robbers” (Han
Shu as in Swann 1950, p. 182, insertion in original).

normal times so as not to divert too much of the people’s time from the fundamental occupation
of agriculture. However, “prodigality should be adopted in a special situation” (Hu 2009, p.
116). If the people lost the foundation of their livelihood and could not work their land because
of natural disasters, the state should offer them employment. At such times, the state should
also encourage the rich to create work—for example, by encouraging them to have lavish
funerals (Guanzi as in Rickett 1998, p. 319). In sum, the Guanzi holds that those “who are good
at ruling a state simply depend upon the situation to relax or intensify their demands” (ibid., p.
415). 15

3. Conclusion
We have seen that the Guanzi articulated distinct principles of government balancing of prices,
market creation, famine prevention, and monopoly control, which were developed in a period
when “a new order emerged from great chaos” (拔乱反正). These policies aimed to protect the
peasant majority from violent fluctuation, cycles, and speculation in the context of the recently
unleashed market powers and to increase commercialization of society while enriching the
state. Rather than working against powerful economic trends, this approach to economic policy
suggested that the state should unleash and harness market forces in order to promote its wealth.
In the Guanzi’s conception the state is both a market creator and stabilizer. There is no
clear separation of the bureaucracy and a private market. Rather the market economy is created
and regulate through the state’s direct commercial participation. The market without the state
is conceptualized as inherently unstable which becomes apparent in the violent price
fluctuations and the threat of famine absent state participation. This means that from the
perspective of the Guanzi the nature of the market without the state is to not be in a position of
rest or equilibrium. As such there is no natural, uniform price that sellers could adhere to. The
stable price only emerges as a result of the balancing by the state. But the Guanzi also insists
that the act of balancing is never perfect and always involves imbalance. This stable price is an
empirically determined price that emerges through the act of balancing the market. It cannot be
theoretically derived or fixed by state order.
Conceptualizing turbulences as an inherent feature of the market when left to its own
devices is a fundamentally different starting point from that of ancient Greek philosophers like
Plato and Aristotle. Coming to the question of price determination from the angle of moral
philosophy, they foreground the right behaviour on the part of the individual not the structural
features of the market. This leads to an emphasis on a moral obligation to charge a fair price
that evolves in Roman law into the state’s right to police and punish those who overcharge their
customers. This is in sharp contrast to the Guanzi’s insistence on fluctuations of prices as
ingrained in the dynamics of the market and the structures of the economy. Movements in prices
in the Guanzi do not emerge from the individuals’ wrong doings but from the normal and
15

This proposal for a countercyclical policy of government spending clearly anticipates, by 2000 years,
Mandeville’s (1970 [1724]) Fable of the Bees, Malthus’s letters to Ricardo (as in Keynes 1936, pp. 362-3), and
Keynes’ theory of effective demand. In light of Keynes’s 1912 review of Chen Huan-Chang (1911b), which
contains a treatment of grain price policies (568–85), the question emerges whether Keynes might in fact have
been inspired by ancient Chinese economic thinking.

legitimate pursuit of self-interest. Therefore, prices can also not be stabilized by punishing
individuals or by appealing to their moral obligations. Instead, price stabilization from the
Guanzi’s perspective requires for the state to balance the structural forces at play. We might
want to think of the Guanzi as a precursor to monetary macroeconomics. In contrast, Platon and
Aristotle path the way for the Italian Scholastics’ inquiry into the right price that prefigures the
value theory of the classical economists.
Here, this comparative exploration of the Guanzi must remain preliminary. To
comprehensively appreciate the differences and commonalities between ancient Greek, Roman
and Chinese thought a much larger research project is required. I hope this piece inspires some
readers to move from Schumpeter’s dismissal of Chinese contributions to curiosity for this
tradition of thought.
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